Bougainville reconstruction aid: what are the issues? by Apthorpe, Raymond
The contribution of
AusAID to this
series is
acknowledged with
appreciation.
‘Today, mipela finisim war bilong Bougainville’,
(‘Today, the war in Bougainville has ended’) said
Sam Kauona, the Commander of the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army, at the ceasefire signed 30
April 1998. This followed the previous
November’s truce. It had become clear by 1997
that a military solution was not possible, that the
conflict ‘had many basic sources’, and that a
desire for peace was widespread and growing
especially in the areas most affected by the
conflict (Interdepartmental Committee 1997). It
was recognised also that
the conflict began because of problems
peculiar to Bougainville, and has extended
and deepened to a large degree because of
tensions within Bougainville. Any lasting
solutions…must as much as possible come
from Bougainvilleans (ibid:4).
By a non-Bougainvillean, but also someone
who has never even visited that Province or
worked anywhere in Papua New Guinea for
decades (and then only for a few months in Port
Moresby at the Central Planning Office), this
essay on aid issues is therefore highly
speculative. It proceeds only by generalisation
and deduction from what appear to be
comparable situations in other parts of the
world.2 No two wars are the same. Obviously
Biafra decades ago, then Mozambique, Somalia,
Liberia and Rwanda more recently, Bosnia and
Afghanistan still, Cambodia, and Rwanda again,
are not Papua New Guinea ten or five years ago
or now. But some commonalities can perhaps be
found.
At the time of writing (May 1998), the Prime
Minister of Papua New Guinea is assuring
Bougainvilleans that they have his support for
the task of peace and re-building in a spirit of
self-reliance and autonomy. It appears that all
Bougainville parties now wish for some types of
aid,3 using mainly Bougainvillean inputs, to
rehabilitate basic services so as to meet
immediate health, education and local roads
needs. To judge from reports of demands for
more of the types of basic livelihood packs
AusAID has provided thus far, this aid response
seems to have been appropriate.
What is not requested (nor, thus far, supplied)
is aid for projects such as airport and seaport
rebuilding. This is ruled out because of the
strategic implications of such projects for what is
feared might become a return to the
‘development’ of old in the province, before the
crisis, now in its tenth year. And this, overall, is
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the position taken here. Contrary to the
development-led approach to reconstruction
proposed in an inter-agency UNDP document
(Rogge 1995), this paper takes the position that
‘development’ ought not to be the watchword.
Rather, as post-war aid needs for reconstruction
are ascertained, it is a word in reconstruction aid
discourse to watch. Humanitarian concerns, rules
and conditionalities should be uppermost.4
Confronted with such situations, perhaps there
are new challenges for ways of thinking about aid
responses. This paper attempts to identify some.
RECURRING THEMES IN AID STUDIES
What has become known and institutionalised as
‘development studies’ stems from assessments of
reconstruction needs for industrialisation in
Europe after World War II in the 1940’s. But this
original association with war studies has largely
been forgotten. The Marshall Aid to Europe after
that war is rarely included in curricula.
Instead foreign ‘development planning’
missions since, say that in (I think) 1948 to
Burma, carried out under ‘expert’ consultancy
agreements, have come to the fore, in Africa,
Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. The field has
become dominated by ideas about peace not war,
green (not red) revolutions and the like as
alternatives to conflict and war. Debt as
originally approached in the context of war
reparations and re-construction has been
submerged in ideas of debt and ‘development’
loans granted not to recover from, but to avert,
war. Which they didn’t, of course.
Centres for ‘development studies’ have
grown greatly during and since the 1960s. Aid
planning and evaluation missions have
multiplied too. Indeed the two phenomena are
closely related. Recently some of these evaluations
have focused on immediate humanitarian, rather
than long term developmental aid, yet the truth
remains that, taken as a whole, and regardless of
whether they have followed an international or
national war or not, aid evaluation studies have
acquired a notably common agenda. Largely this
transcends distinctions between particular
categories of aid, and so it should: most of the
important issues overlap.
Thus there is much to gain from keeping a
broader picture in mind when thinking about aid
issues for Bougainville.
The issues that most commonly surface in,
and shape, aid studies include
•  expert—usually economic—theories,
their translation into policies, and the
reading of actual events in the light of these
and other considerations
• aid seen as a lubricant or fuel
• organisational and administrative issues
of consultation and coordination between all
parties
• environmental resources issues
• aid and the politics of economics, and the
economics of politics
• aid as productive of progress, or
subsidising poverty, in the recipient country
• business and other gains from aid in the
source country
• human resources and their depletion and
sustainability
• capital-intensive big compared with
labour-intensive small projects
• aid and sovereignty; foreign and defence
policy and international relations
• optimal technological solutions regardless
of social circumstances
• aid, conditionality, and absorptive
capacity
• ideology, culture, tradition and
development
• centralisation and decentralisation of
governance
• global, macro, mezo and micro levels;
unanticipated and counterproductive effects;
and language and labelling practices.
Negatively, another commonality of aid
studies as a whole is the lack of social validity (or
validation) of their analyses. For example they
normally almost totally avoid social class
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analysis. Indicators which are not about social
solidarity, social mobilisation and so forth are
called ‘social indicators’ nonetheless (a trend
which current ‘social capital’ concerns in
‘development studies’ are unlikely to change
very much).
‘Ethnicity’ is seldom presented in aid studies
as a social and political process but as a cultural,
or even a racial, given. For example the whole
world knows about ‘the Tutsi’ and ‘the Hutu’
Rwanda as ‘tribes’, yet they are not ‘tribes’.5 So if
there is ‘tribalism’ in Rwanda it is ‘tribalism
without tribes’ (cf Destexhe 1995).
BOUGAINVILLE AS A ‘COMPLEX
EMERGENCY’
According to all press and other accounts of the
war and peace processes seen,6 the armed conflict
in the province was about immediate and
ultimate statal, governmental and ideological
authority over self-determination, personal and
group identity, and the control of local and
outside resources. Dispute about theories of
progress and traditional and new social structure
played an important part too. Such multiplicity
and complexity of themes—and actors—is
common in such complex situations, where much
has been destroyed but also much affirmed, and
something created.
The term ‘complex emergency’ (see Duffield
1994; Apthorpe and Nevile 1998) is a diplomatic
euphemism for ‘man-made’ civil and military
conflict, as contrasted with ‘natural’ turbulence
such as drought and famine. It was first used in
UN circles during Mozambique’s 17 year long
civil war. The term has acquired institutional
status in relief—and development—institutes
since.7 I use it here for the nearly ten years of war
in Papua New Guinea’s Bougainville Province. It
remains controversial nevertheless. Policy induced,
survival-threatening conflict and hardship resulting
in loss of life and major displacements of
populations are part of the story of ‘natural
disasters’ as well (Alexander 1997). Consider for
example the present drought and frost inflicted
hardship in Papua New Guinea (which has not
seriously affected most of Bougainville), and the
1994 volcanic eruption in Rabaul. Now in North
Korea, as recurring in Ethiopia, critical food
shortage is as much a matter of institutions as of
environments. In Bangladesh in the typhoon
season it is poverty that kills more than the floods.
Especially in the case of repeated famine
following recurring drought or flooding, the
complexity of response that is needed is not
measured by the Richter scale, or climatologists’
or geographers’ assessments of land conditions
in districts and sub-districts affected by natural
disasters. Note, however, that in ‘complex
emergency’ and ‘natural disaster’, ‘emergency’ is
the noun used in the former, ‘disaster’ in the
latter. While civil wars mean disasters for some
parties, for others, they are something different:
planned civil, military and economic strategies
pursued by force of arms to win battles and a war.
My argument proceeds on the assumptions
that the main elements of comparability of
Bougainville with other complex emergencies are
as follows.
• In general, rescue and reconstruction aid
seeks similar general outcomes with regard
to complex emergencies and their immediate
aftermaths: namely, institutional provision
for new beginnings, peace and recovery.
Which institutions are most involved may
vary, but those pertaining to security, justice
and human rights come usually to the fore.
Humanitarian dimensions loom larger than
say those of macroeconomics and structural
adjustment.
• Typically, complex emergencies have
similar aetiologies and phenomenologies,
namely, similar types and expressions of
disputed areas of effective responsibility as
regards centralisation and decentralisation of
politics and planning, and actions taken with
regard to these. For example ideas of
autonomy, even secession, may come up.
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• Matters are complicated by disputed
frameworks of regional international (and
indeed ‘post-international’ or ‘global’)
relations and politics. Key players are seen to
be villainous and virtuous at almost the same
time. In Bougainville ‘patronising’ Australian
involvements are seen as part of the problem,
but appropriate Australian involvements as
part of the solution.
• As a rule, the disputed national
framework involves rival social and
economic ideologies and strategies for life
and livelihood, including those about the
design of welfare and distribution of existing
and new resources allocations. Of course
there were competing causes also before the
war, but with a difference: normally
developmentalism’s causes are without
armed rebels (or rebels of any description
where dissent is uncommon or excluded). A
peace process must address causes with
rebels, and casualties—rebels who have put
their causes violently on the map, and
casualties who are in need of urgent help
now, not in the notional long run.
EIGHT ISSUES FOR BOUGAINVILLE
The following are among the issues to be
addressed before an aid response in Bougainville
can be composed. They are not exclusive to this
case, but arguably are pertinent to it.
A DOSE OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
To take just one example, consider the use of the
terms ‘stability’ and ‘chaos’. So often in aid
studies these are treated as if they were always
dichotomous or polar terms. Official (and other
organisational) aid discourse practices rely
heavily on polar words, of which only one is
loaded with positive value. For example
‘stability’ is contrasted just with ‘chaos’.
Language influences thought. The result is that
thinking about the varieties and natures of these
states, the reasons and prices paid for them, and
the many situations in between, gets squeezed
out. Everything gets reduced to extremes. The
result is not analysis, but lack of analysis. False
comparison, over-generalisation, exaggeration, is
paraded instead.
There are many kinds and effects of ‘stability’
and ‘chaos’. If ‘development’ is a word in aid
discourse to watch, so also are these two words.
Like peace, they may bring some chaos and
casualties, but wars are strategies fought at great
cost for objectives ranked even higher than life
itself, not just unfortunate hiccups in a normative
linear process. Labelling them just as ‘chaos’
entirely misses this and leads you back too
uncritically and too fast to another false
analysis—of the ‘stability’ that is said to have
gone before.
It is well-known that in complex emergencies
‘government breaks down’. But while this is true
for some levels of governance, it is not necessarily
true for all. Neither would anyone tuned to the
sorts of issues normally grouped as
‘decentralisation’ fail to expect that, while some
levels of authority and control are in crisis, other
levels may for this very reason become not only
more visible to analysts now than they were to
analysts not looking for them, but, besides this,
also somewhat stronger. In which case surely
they are obvious potential to be considered for
institutional partnership for reconstruction at least.
For Somalia one thinks for example of ‘clans’
and their heads. In Liberia just before the war
ended government ministers told me for example
how important ‘traditional authorities’ were for
agriculture as well as local governance.
REFOCUS PRIORITIES FROM ‘THE
ECONOMIC’ TO ‘THE SOCIAL’
As a peace process sets in after a long emergency,
if society and its group and individual
psychological fabric is not restored and rebuilt as
a first priority, there would be nothing for
structural economic aid to build on later.
Reconstruction aid thinking ought to be led
by peace, and social and political analysis.
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neglected but put in second place. And surely
this is particularly true for Bougainville where a
certain type of economic issue—mainly of the
mine—played such a critical role in the
generation of the conflict.
The United Nations Development
Programme 1995–97 report on rehabilitation and
reconstruction needs assessment and program
proposals (mentioned at the beginning of this
paper) says
no evidence was found of a concerted effort
be either the government or NGOs aimed at
directly facilitating a healing and recovery
process. The NGO sector has however been
providing basic counselling…and spiritual
rehabilitation as part of their rehabilitation
activities. These efforts should form the basis
of a well developed social rehabilitation
programmes (sic) using a strategy which is
based upon a participatory approach. Such
an approach should be firmly based upon
the people’s faith and engage all sectors,
including former competence (sic), in a
process which builds a sense of unity in the
community (Rogge 1995:50).
To which, I would add, ‘justice’ as a path to
reconciliation.
Presumably one option for discussion would
be a method of ‘truth commission’ and ‘apology’,
with or without power to commit to trial.
Another path to justice and society could be less
individualistic and more group-centred, such as
redesign and intensification of sports, cultural
and other activities with collective bases of
participation.
Of the major studies of complex emergency in
other parts of the world which say or imply that
‘the social’ and ‘the institutional’ should be put
first, one is Randolph Kent’s on Rwanda. After
serving for a period as Humanitarian
Coordinator there, this author of the earliest
classic text on the anatomy of relief insists on ‘the
centrality of the social’ and calls for willingness
to address the fundamental requirements of a
society in crisis’ (Kent 1995:29). But he found
that, because a particularly rapid response is
required, a donor community can be at a loss—
an impasse even—if the stabilisation
requirements fit neither conventional categories
of development nor normal assumptions about
relief, say after earthquakes.
Kent singled out three problems that
bedevilled efforts in Rwanda to respond to what
he calls societal ‘stabilisation’ needs urgently,
speedily and specifically
• the type of needs themselves for which
provision appears too politically sensitive
(such as prisons, military facilities, even
salaries for soldiers)
• where needs are seen to be less politically
sensitive, what really is required—
magistrates, courts, legal texts, or more
traditional adjudication systems—is
controversial
• slow and cumbersome aid procedures for
considering and acting on these issues make
rapid response difficult anyway.
As regards Bougainville, think for example of
the presently sensitive issues concerning
incorporating Bougainville Revolutionary Army
and Resistance members as auxiliary police, and
the role of local and traditional judicial
institutions.
Because donors and agencies habitually
commission only economic, not social and
economic analysis, they do not find it easy to
focus on social and political issues. Instead they
see them as inherently contentious, beyond
intellectual analysis, to be displaced either into
the ‘too hard’ basket or that reserved for nuts,
protesters, ideologues (on the premise that aid
deals now with a non-ideological world—you
see capital is non-ideological) or, heaven forbid,
socialists.
Per contra, economic issues are regarded as
‘technical’ and ‘managerial’, difficult, yes,
especially at the macro level to calculate correctly,
but not subjective or inherently open to bias, only
occasional and unfortunate error which remedial
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technical work can correct. But why the current
Asian crisis as it is called came as such a shock to
orthodox economists, and why also it will soon
be subsumed by them into inevitability, is not a
story that can be told here.
When aid thinking does not neglect ‘social
aspects’ altogether it tends to trivialise them, to
treat them less professionally than other concerns
(the assumption being that anyone can deal with
social reform issues, but for economic analysis
you need specialists—economists—and for
‘global’ analysis particularly: the economism
inherent in the current globalisation paradigm is
the result of this being the work of orthodox neo-
classical economists only). But as regards
protracted political emergency, as we have seen
‘social aspects’ and ‘political aspects’ are central
and defining. At the extreme, for a change,
‘economic aspects’ may be considered to be
marginal or optional extras for an aid design or
an evaluation to take note of. Which is why
among other things the role of ‘the war economy’
in the longevity of complex emergencies is not seen.
The needs analysis and three year provincial
action plan for Bougainville rehabilitation and
social re-development prepared by a group
including the National Research Institute of
Papua New Guinea already cited (Bopp and Ahai
n.d.) regrets the preoccupation it reports with
restoring only the physical structure. It
complains that, apart from formal education and
health services, almost everything else is neglected.
About the ‘spiritual, psychological and social
wounds’ the crisis has caused, it finds at least
five kinds of problems for which healing and
rehabilitation are needed: ‘spiritual dislocation
and confusion…post trauma shock and
distress…grieving and loss…the war zone
mentality, payback, conflict and estrangement.’
DO NOT VIEW TURBULENCE ONLY
NEGATIVELY
Because aid thinking normally borrows so
extensively from secular and neo-classical
ideology as to hold, virtually exclusively, that
only under un-turbulent conditions could aid
achieve its stated aims, it has a severe handicap
when faced with complex emergencies: taking
only negative views of turbulence, even where
politically aid bureaux may be under pressure to
break with this tradition.
Finding the will and the way to view
turbulence not only negatively, would reveal for
example the technological and organisational
advances where self-reliance is enforced to an
unusual degree that war can bring—as for
example in Southern Rhodesia as it was
becoming Zimbabwe, and as regards health
services in Tigray during the long Ethiopian civil
war. Such creativity is ignored because it is
assumed it could never have happened.
Where there have been such advances, then
surely reconstruction aid would be wise to try to
build on them, not overlook what was created as
well as what it has destroyed, including what
people under conditions of great adversity have
invented (or re-invented) to survive.
What is required is not just to forgive and
forget, or to take the view that the war was
purely a setback. Otherwise those who put their
lives at risk and suffered, or even died, as well as
those who under great conditions of hardship
managed to survive, will be consigned to have
done so for nothing.
PUT HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONALITIES
FIRST
After, as well as during, a long and destructive
war, few would fail to see a strong case for
humanitarian emergency aid. Donors tend to see
this form of aid, however, as more or less the
opposite of structural economic aid despite the
increasing proportions of ‘official development
aid’ actually spent on emergency aid.
Reconstruction issues after a long and serious
complex emergency are peace issues first,
development issues second. After a long war it is
humanitarian space that is in shortest supply, for
which conditionalities such as ‘democracy’ and
‘good governance’ are inappropriate. During and
Bougainville Reconstruction Aid
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governed mainly by human rights issues. Where
there is a peace process, aid should be governed
first by what would make for success for that,
and by eventual or ultimate economic
development issues only second.
Economic development planning is rarely
processual. Much more characteristic are
lopsidedly-composed ad hoc missions of outsiders
flying in to make master plans all at once with
little taste for consultative and negotiatory
approaches, and much for standard packages.
Civilians and unarmed soldiers monitoring a
ceasefire and making humanitarian space, and
visiting economic (or for that matter social)
planners armed with grants and loans and
political conditionality, are as different as chalk
and cheese.
Aid agencies with the power to impose their
own ‘development’ conditionalities include those
prescribing a food-for-work approach to food
aid. Their idea is that, so that this aid will not be
treated just as a hand-out, recipients must work
to receive it. But whatever merits this moral may
have for ‘development’, the arguments against it
for relief are overpowering. Why assume that in
a life-threatening crisis handouts engender
dependency? And it is anyway well known that
even under the ‘development’ banner the ‘work’
part of the ‘food for work’ approach is often so
badly conceived and planned that it is little more
than make-work.
Putting ‘development’ first reflects agencies’
positions more than those of the people they try
to serve. In the Pacific as elsewhere,
‘displacement’ has many causes and effects yet
despite the undoubted traumas that refugees and
internally displaced people may suffer acutely,
evaluations show survivors to be by no means as
passive as relief agencies are inclined to say.
There is no reason on that score therefore for the
dispossessed to be prevented from being active
participants in their own welfare determination,
which in the circumstances they are more likely
see in terms of relief—and rehabilitation—than
development especially while still displaced. If
agencies do not consult with their beneficiaries
because they don’t know how, they ought to be
assisted to learn how—but in relief, as in
development, information gaps are only part of
the problem.
A recurring problem of humanitarian
assistance, as noted for instance in a study on
Afghanistan, is the frequent extent to which it
labels people as ‘victims’ rather than
respecting them as survivors’ and the
principal actors in bringing about recovery
and change. External interveners should be
designing their programs as enabling
strategies to ease and facilitate the
communities’ own mechanisms for coping,
taking due account of the larger picture and
the fact that there may be many different,
sometimes overlapping, ‘communities’
within any given locality (Donini et al.
1996:41).
Unfortunately, little is known about cases
where international, governmental and non-
governmental organisations have not failed to
work closely with the victims of wars thus
making them truly beneficiaries, and whether the
opportunities presented for this by their
concentration in camps have been duly exploited.
Sometimes relief agencies find they need to
redefine the concept ‘refugee’ to include
‘internally displaced people’, as both an agency
mandate, as well as a human rights issue.
Whether internally displaced people are labelled
‘political’ or ‘economic’ refugees is, however, a
different important issue, as also is that of the
types of assistance merited.
RECONSIDER THE SUPPOSEDLY POOR
TRACK-RECORD OF HUMANITARIAN AID
Advocates of structural aid tend to see
emergency aid even as a disaster within the
disaster, or at least as a poorly thought-through,
gut reaction to human suffering.
The case they make against emergency aid is
multifaceted. It is
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• increasingly excessive (and normally in
grant-aid form) in amount (and therefore
both envied because it is competitive with
other dispositions, suspected for its
externalities)
• typically expensive (for example relief is
delivered by airlift, and unlike say large
development loans difficult to determine and
deliver)
• necessarily hit-and-miss (in the sense that
it is seldom served by good needs
assessment studies and professional ex ante
appraisals); difficult for the recipient country
to absorb (Macrae et al. 1997:227)
• wasteful (given the many media reports of
losses, diversions thefts and confused
analysis that wrongly equates occasional
diversions of relief with the war economy)
(Borton 1998)
• unplanned (because on the whole
emergency as compared with structural aid
is badly monitored and evaluated or not
reviewed at all)
• effectively uncoordinated (not least
because it is common for many agencies to
be involved)
• and, even worse, counter-productive of its
stated effects (because emergency aid is
widely seen as fuelling the fire as well as
saving some of its victims, and a reflex action
resulting in relief not being put out to tender
in the same way as is structural economic aid
typically).
Each of these criticisms should be taken
seriously. Indeed some are shared by the
proponents of emergency humanitarian aid
themselves, when looking more effective
approaches. But for proponents of either
structural or emergency aid to hold that if only
emergency relief aid were more like economic
development aid it would have fewer of these
crippling characteristics, would make matters
worse not better. A short-term throwing of relief
aid is obviously not the answer to long-term
developmental (nor immediate relief) problems
either, but to argue that structural aid is the
answer to relief-reconstruction-rehabilitation is to
miss the point from the other side. Throwing
development aid was not the answer before, nor
is it now.
Superficially attractive though such criticisms
of emergency aid are, they nevertheless have
defects, surely for the Pacific no less than the rest
of the world. For one thing it is stubbornly
misdirected and therefore irrelevant in crucial
regards. For another, it assumes too rosy an
impression of the management and outcomes of
economic development aid. On this latter issue,
about ‘development’, a National Research
Institute of Papua New Guinea assisted report
(Bopp and Ahai n.d.) notes that
all over Bougainville there is unanimous
concern that the current restoration and
rehabilitation exercise is simply re-building
the same type of development process that
led to the crisis. There is strong expression of
desire by the people to learn development
lessons from the crisis so that the rebuilding
process does not reproduce the
developmental ills that gave rise to the crisis
in the first place.
My critique of structural aid’s critique of
humanitarian emergency aid is mainly as
follows.
First, the economic structural aid’s critique is
blind to the specificities and exigencies of
emergencies, including the counterfactual case
(that nothing done would be better than
something done). The grounds and requirements
for humanitarian aid are different from those for
development aid. They attract different kinds of
aid workers, and call for different kinds of
evaluation. Rescue for sheer survival now is
what motivates the former, and readiness to cope
in situations in which otherwise normal concepts
of ‘state’ and ‘government’ barely apply, and
with all the various parties to the emergency
having structurally different perceptions and
Bougainville Reconstruction Aid
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is not.
That the first casualty of complex emergency
is numbers (as truth is the first casualty of war,
and coordination the first casualty of peace), is
another distinguishing feature. Each agency and
organisation prefers its own concepts of
emergency and, to suit these, its own figures.
Neutral or impartial sources are absent.
Emergencies are chaotic, but, contrary to the
dominant discourse, not entirely chaotic. While
they are disastrous for some parties, they are
strategies for others. Where sovereignty is
disputed, pre-existing norms and organisational
arrangements are in the sharpest flux. Therefore
pre-set conditionalities such as are familiar in
structural aid simply cannot apply, even if they
should.
Second, the record of economic development
aid everywhere in the world in achieving its
stated objectives is poor, and not dependent on
the nature and quality of this aid itself, except
possibly as lubrication not fuel.7 I know of no
evidence that even large amounts of aid poured
into ‘development projects’, however big—such
as dams—have averted or contained, let alone
prevented, internal (and other) war.
If economic structural aid’s record is poor,
there is no prima facie case for it to serve as a
model for any other type of aid.
Third, besides overestimating the track-record
of structural aid as investment, underestimating
that of relief aid as speculation (Apthorpe 1997),
and ignoring restoration and rehabilitation issues
as such, advocacies of economic structural over
emergency aid have the further failing: they do
not give the conflict at the heart of the war the
attention it deserves.
This third crippling defect is more a
syndrome of features than a single point.
Structural economic aid, modernisation theory,
and globalisation discourse all take a similar
disposition to protracted violent political crisis:
war is a brutal disruption, a pathology, so as soon
as it is over, things should get back to where they
were before as if earlier theory and policy were
entirely blameless for what followed it.
But war is not the opposite of peace, except in
the dictionary.
DITCH THE ‘RELIEF-DEVELOPMENT
CONTINUUM’
Mainly derived from thinking about ‘natural
disaster’ in relatively non-conflict- driven
situations, the ‘relief-development’ continuum
concept emerged in UNDP circles in the early 90s
(if not before) as the main precept that ought to
guide emergency aid. With the pertinence of this
idea to aid after earthquakes or floods, this paper
is not concerned. As regards complex
emergencies and reconstruction efforts after
these, however, it can be more part of the
problem than the solution (‘forget the continuum
and build the barracks…where the victims are
the society itself and the capacity to govern’,
Kent 1995:27–8).
It is unfortunate that the 1995–97 UN inter-
agency report on Bougainville reconstruction
fails to see this. On the contrary, it argues that
this continuum must lie at its heart. To quote
from its 1995 version
[t]he underpinning construct for this report
is the paradigm of the ‘relief to development
continuum’…The basic notion here is that
relief should not be conceptually separated
from rehabilitation and that rehabilitation be
not conceptually separated from
development; all should be implemented in
unison so that the one rapidly blends into the
other [that is as a ‘continuum’]…Few today
question this inseparable link between
sustainable development and the effective
management of natural, conflict-induced and
other human-made disasters…Thus, in its
coordinating capacity, UNDP must ensure
that post-disaster activities are, as far as
possible within a developmental construct
(Rogge 1995).
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It would be better to ditch this continuum
concept, or at least development-led versions of it
as an axiomatic truth. That, however, a (so far as
we can see) permanent player on the foreign-aid
scene which is mandated with a coordinating
role, should wish to see a coordinated approach
within which short and long term aid could be
considered together, obviously is
unexceptionable. Presumably this is why the
continuum idea caught on for the United Nations
Development Programme. But other parties
involved, with other mandates, ask for example
how the content of its two terms (it should at
least read ‘relief-rehabilitation-development’) is
defined and find problems with this.
‘Few’ may have challenged it but those that
have have drawn from actual experience, and
hope that aid next time will have fewer counter-
productive effects than it had last. They resist
being so mesmerised by the abstraction of the
continuum idea as to ignore the actual contents of
its defining terms of discourse in the pertinent
situations, and the frames and contexts in which
it is used.
Fortunately, a United Nations Department of
Human Affairs (now United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs)
document, also of 1995, is in sharp contrast to this
United Nations Development Programme
position. It does not specifically address the
Bougainville case yet it appears to fit it better in
noting that the continuum idea
…is increasingly being challenged…the idea
of a ‘linear’ continuum does not reflect the
chronic nature of conflict and vulnerability in
many countries. Nor does it acknowledge the
weaknesses in the development process
itself, which has not given sufficient attention
to building the capacity of developing
countries to deal effectively with the ‘shocks’
of instability and conflict (Kent 1995:8).
This paper then obviously prefers the United
Nations Department of Human Affairs position:
‘Any suggestion…that the principles of
development can be uncritically transferred into
the domain of relief should be treated with some
caution’ (idem). Indeed almost all complex
emergency policy evaluations now available (for
a summary of the main themes, see Borton and
Macrae 1997) advise strongly against a
development-led approach to relief, and go
further than just suggesting caution. Overall
there is a very strong case for not a ‘continuum’
but say a ‘contiguum’ (or a ‘dis-continuum’) idea
if this would capture the notion of thinking
simultaneously about both now and the future. A
range of considerations ought indeed to be taken
on board not one by one, but all at once.
Further, as an excellent Sudan study (Macrae
et al. 1997) based on evaluation of the Operation
Lifeline emergency aid program and a
penetrating evaluation of a donor’s aid program
in Cambodia (Bernander et al. 1995) show, there
is nothing institutionally neutral about moving
this way, or that way, along the continuum as an
agency thinks fit. Different participation,
partnership and conditionality implications
attach to different positions taken. Complex
questions of political neutrality and impartiality
arise in conditions of conflict particularly, and in
complex forms of conflict especially.
Such institutional policy issues could be
regarded as sorting into three broad categories.
Some are on the side of the donor and channel
agencies and their agendas: different agencies and
organisations take different positions as regards
not only relief and ‘development’ separately, but
their linkage and lack of linkage and what
implications arise for programs accordingly. Other
policy issues pertain mainly to questions of which
partner organisations to work with. Yet others
point to beneficiaries: who are considered to be in
the greatest need depends partly on which
organisations put these questions and which are
most affected by the answers.
The Sudan discussion (Macrae et al. 1997)
takes up the crucial matter of timing. It asks
when would it be legitimate to move from relief
to development program planning? Its answer is
that three fundamental conditions must be in
Bougainville Reconstruction Aid
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humanitarian access; plain evidence that the
emergency is over; and donors’ foreign policy
recognition of the legitimacy of all parties in the
conflict and peace process.
Finally, the continuum concept is about
sequence and overlap over time. It tends to neglect
spatial comparisons and linkages, in a word,
geographical justice. For instance there are many
examples of so much aid being given to refugees
in camps as in effect to leave displaced people not
in camps, and the ordinary local population
relatively much worse off than they were before.
In Angola, where to a considerable extent at
one period malnutrition was effectively reduced
in a war zone, outside this, in urban slums
subject to a ‘development’ not a relief aid regime,
there was—and still is—steady increase in
malnutrition. Exactly as a seasoned medical
authority on relief has said of this case (Seaman
1994), the juxtaposition of large sums being spent
to feed one group while another starves ‘…is
uncomfortable but under the relief-development
continuum ideology, the two actions are not
necessarily incompatible’ (Seaman 1994).
Such examples of increased inequality are so
common that they are anticipatable effects of
relief aid.
The continuum concept has been allowed to
appear axiomatic where, as it would be put in
policy discourse analysis terms, there has been a
focus narrowly on denotation only, not broadly
taking in connotation as well.
About times of turbulence, lateral thinking is
needed. Wars are times of order as well as
disorder, concealed to an extent by an exceptional
multiplicity of stakeholders, actors, objectives
and goals. An inclusive perspective, that learns
from them, must be found. It is useless simply to
wish they had never happened.
COME TO TERMS WITH THE FACT THAT
OURS IS NOT A NON-IDEOLOGICAL AGE
Since what is called ‘the end of the cold war’, it
has become common to speak also of ‘the end of
ideology’, ‘the end of history’, and so on. But
ours is not a non-ideological age. Behind the
predatory pragmatism of the market is the
ideology of capitalism.
Further, not all conflicts during the cold war
were because of the cold war. Indeed some were
scarcely affected by it. Consider Biafra for
example. While it may be true that since the
collapse of the Soviet union there have been more
complex emergencies than before, it is simplistic
to package all of these wars into just one
international relations envelope.
The best accounts of the conflict in
Bougainville tell of a complex set of situations in
which ideological issues are arguably even more
important than those of identity and secession.
This is exactly what one would expect of a civil
war, despite its banditry and the like.
BE PROFESSIONAL ABOUT ENTRY AND
EXIT STRATEGIES
To judge from the Sudan but also for example
Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cambodia,
deciding exactly when a complex emergency is
over is most difficult. Getting the timing wrong,
however, can lead not only to a premature move
to ‘development’, but also from relief and
rehabilitation. Typically governmental pressure
to do the former is motivated by wanting to
regain international credibility as soon as possible.
Perhaps the government originally delayed
acknowledgement of the need for relief for the
same reason. Donors and agencies on their part,
as their resources dwindle, may move not only to
targeting strategies they didn’t use earlier but
something more: premature change away from
the relief mode altogether.
The danger is, in either eventuality, for
depleting-resources-driven positions to serve as
excuses for, or mask, the missing of relief exit
strategies.
Private voluntary organisations’ positions
and continuum-riding, in whichever direction,
are variable. A few such organisations may be
known for careful planning of both their entry
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and exit from the relief scene. Most are not. And
complex emergencies certainly attract large
numbers of non-government organisations—
more than 100 in the case of Mozambique, more
than 200 in Rwanda. Taken together, their
enthusiasms will outrun their competencies.
At all events, as a peace process gets
underway, the need for real partnership and
cooperation and coordination is immense. Not
meeting this challenge leads only to a disaster
within a disaster.
CONCLUSION: AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH
TO REHABILITATION IS NEEDED
To conclude, reconstruction issues should be
approached in a broad frame. Reconstruction in
Bougainville, where the war has been long and
enclosed, presents challenges to conventional
‘development’ aid practices and responses in the
following respects.
Taking a post-emergency perspective alone is
not enough: historical analysis of the pre-
emergency situation is necessary, including the
nature and effects of program and project aid
then, and not only in the Province of
Bougainville but Papua New Guinea at large.
Reconstruction aid should be guided first and
foremost by an analysis of the course the war has
taken over the past nine years or so, and why,
and how, and with what effects.
The extent to which an internal war has raged
for ideological reasons among others must be
ascertained so that not only the symptoms of a
deeper malaise will be addressed. In the Pacific
as in Africa, the translation of the cold war in
international relations into predatory and
inequitable market penetration by the advantaged
in the name of globalisation, has only marginally
altered the nature of conflict, and relief and
rehabilitation, with which humanitarian aspects of
an aid program have to deal.
As part of a wider effort to collect
information, a positive as well as a negative view
of turbulence is required, so as to learn from and
build on the constructive things that have been
done in a war. In Bougainville these are said to
include adaptations of local health systems and
innovative mini-hydro schemes.
If the success of the peace process is because it
is a broadly based participatory and negotiatory
process, then this is the mode that should be
projected and continued into reconstruction and
beyond.
By contrast, ‘development planning’
approaches typically take the form not of broadly
based and consultative negotiatory processes but
incidental, expert, invasive, over-riding, pre-
packaged and largely alien interventions. If the
‘development planning’ interventions that
preceded the war in Bougainville—and Papua
New Guinea as a whole—were of this order, they
should be shelved. To resume standard economic
planning approaches could derail the peace
process. A return to the past may not help usher
in the future.
The rules of aid-for-reconstruction design,
disbursement and evaluations of outcomes
should not be development-led. Rather they
should be grounded first and foremost in terms
of international humanitarian, and human rights,
law and conditionality.
To support protection and negotiated access,
societal restoration, and the forms of
coordination and cooperation of all parties
needed for this, ought to be the prime guide for
aid. Not economic rationality, nor of course
economic ir-rationality.
As far as socio-psychological trauma is
concerned, aid should be guided by the principle
that time does not heal. Not everything comes
right by itself. Or if by good fortune it should,
this might well have to do with the timeliness of
aid, not what should be done in the short, the
long or another run.
Aid for social healing and stabilisation is
reported as lacking in Bougainville and should
become an urgent priority.
As mainly a single donor—AusAID—in
Bougainville becomes part of a wider cast where
Bougainville Reconstruction Aid
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local non-governmental agencies, come to figure
prominently, the urgency for sensitive and
effective aid coordination becomes vital.
Some aid should be given specifically to assist
this process of coordination. The primary
institutional responsibility for cooperation,
partnership and coordination should rest with the
responsible government, not say the United
Nations Development Programme or United
Nations Office of the High Commisioner for
Humanitarian Affairs or any other outside
instrumentality.
NOTES
Raymond Apthorpe is at Five Houses
International, Sydney and a Visiting Professor at
the National Centre for Development Studies at
the Australian National University.
1 I am indebted above all to Anthony Regan for
meticulous comments on the longer version of
this paper, for the book he is editing on
Bougainville, and sharing his knowledge of the
war and peace processes in Bougainville with
me. I am grateful too to graduate students from
Papua New Guinea in my classes at the National
Centre for Development Studies, also an
Australian National University seminar by
Kapeato Puasia, Leader of the Bougainville
Transitional Government negotiating team and
Provincial Legal Officer, and those kindly
attending the Australian National University
seminar at which, at Sinclair Dinnen’s invitation,
this paper was given. To whom I am grateful also
for helpful comments.
2 My experience of internal war and its aftermath
is not as a participant but—once—as an invited
peace talks liaison person, in Uganda for the
Nigeria-Biafra peace talks, and—three times—as
an invited external policy evaluator, once for an
international agency, once for a bilateral donor’s
programs, and once for a church.
3 This ‘information-in-circulation’ from a variety
of sources, official and scholarly, is not fully on
the record and in some regards is difficult for an
outsider to judge. But it does not appear to be
disputed.
4 This is not to say that there is no case for multi-
purpose aid, or that all boundary lines between
these type-categories are categorically completely
clear, or that a more detailed analysis would be
satisfied to remain within the relief:development
polarity as, for reasons of exposition, this writing
does. Nor is it to deny that ‘relief’ too is
problematic, or that desired goals, impact and
other features are not expressed in conflicting
terms—as for example explored in an evaluation
of Swedish support to emergency aid in Cambodia
(Bernander et al. 1995).
5 My own view is that the conflict in Rwanda
would in some regards be better labelled ‘class
conflict’ than ‘tribal conflict’. At least this would
allow intra-Hutu social and political dynamics,
that are so important in the crisis, to be better
appreciated, and the institutions of politics not
reduced to mechanics and physics. What
popularly gets called ‘tribalism’ with regard to
Papua New Guinea was critiqued long ago (see
for example Nelson 1972).
6 For example Interdepartmental Committee
1997; Adlide 1997; Regan 1998; The Australian 9
May 1998. Again I am grateful to Anthony Regan
for putting Bougainville materials at my disposal
and tutoring me on their status and implications.
7 For example now there is a lectureship in
complex emergency at the London School of
Economics and Political Science’s Institute of
Development Studies. This year a professional
short course and master’s degree module on
evaluating complex emergency humanitarian aid
in complex emergency was given at The
Australian National University’s National Centre
for Development Studies. However, besides
‘complex emergency’, other terms which could
equally serve our purposes if they were as
widely used include for example ‘collective
challenge to state sovereignty’, to borrow from a
study comparing coups in Bougainville and Fiji
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(Larmour 1992), or ‘war of
political dominance’, to borrow
from a study comparative of
humanitarian intervention in
Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia
(Nederveen Pieterse 1997). All
these expressions put political,
social, economic and other
conflict at the heart of the
matter, conflict about
legitimacy, power, society, the
economy, livelihood and much
else. The implication is that
‘settlement’ of the conflict must
be similarly multi-faceted, not
only military, nor, for that
matter, political or social or
environmental.
8 The evidence—too conflicting,
controversial and massive to
enter here—comes now
increasingly from officials of
(or consultants reporting to) aid
agencies themselves, as well as
outside sources.
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